Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries

Law Journals

12-24-2009

Summary of In The Matter of the Parental Rights as to N.J., 125
Nev. Adv. Op. No. 62
Paul C. Williams
Nevada Law Journal

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Williams, Paul C., "Summary of In The Matter of the Parental Rights as to N.J., 125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 62"
(2009). Nevada Supreme Court Summaries. 337.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/337

This Case Summary is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository
administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please
contact youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

In The Matter of the Parental Rights as to N.J., 125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 62
(Dec. 24, 2009) 1
Family Law - Termination of Parental Rights - ICWA
Summary
Appeal of a district court order terminating the parental rights of Dawn M. as to N.J., a
minor. The Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) petitioned the district court to
terminate the parental rights of Dawn after unsuccessfully attempting to reunify N.J. with Dawn.
Dawn appealed arguing the district court erred in (1) finding clear and convincing evidence of
parental fault, and (2) applying the Existing Indian Family (EIF) doctrine after finding DCFS did
not meet Indian Child Welfare Act’s (ICWA) beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
Disposition/Outcome
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order terminating parental rights.
The Court adopted a dual-standard burden of proof for termination of parental rights cases
involving ICWA, utilizing Nevada's "clear and convincing evidence" for state law findings and
ICWA's "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for ICWA findings. The Court upheld that there
was clear and convincing evidence of parental fault. The Court upheld the application of the EIF
doctrine because the breakup of a Native American family was not at issue and neither the child's
father (who was Native American) nor his tribe were contesting the termination.
Factual and Procedural History
At N.J.'s birth, both N.J. and Dawn tested positive for Marijuana and Methamphetamine.
Because N.J.'s putative father could not be located and no safe placement could be found, the
Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) was given custody of N.J. and she was placed
into foster care. Eventually N.J.'s putative father, Javy J., contacted DCFS. DNA testing
showed that Javy was the father of N.J.; nevertheless Javy denied paternity and never made
further contact with DCFS. Because Javy was an enrolled member of the Ely Shoshone Tribe,
N.J. was eligible to become a member of the tribe. Dawn was not a member of any Native
American Tribe. DCFS created a case plan for Dawn to follow in order to reunify with N.J., but
Dawn did not comply.
DCFS petitioned the district court to terminate the parental rights of Dawn due to her
failure to comply with the case plan and her continued drug use. Because N.J. was a Native
American child, the parental termination proceedings were subject to the Indian Child Welfare
Act (ICWA). The district court applied a dual-level evidentiary standard, using Nevada's "clear
and convincing evidence" for state law findings and ICWA's "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard for ICWA findings. The district court found that clear and convincing evidence
supported terminating Dawn's parental rights, but DCFS failed to meet ICWA's "beyond a
reasonable doubt" burden. However, the district court held the Existing Indian Family Doctrine
applied because neither N.J's putative father, nor her putative father's tribe, contested the
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termination and the breakup of a Native American family was not at issue. The district court
granted the petition to Terminate Parental Rights.
Discussion
Dawn appealed the termination of her parental rights arguing the district court erred in (1)
finding clear and convincing evidence of parental fault, and (2) applying the Existing Indian
Family (EIF) doctrine after finding DCFS did not meet ICWA's burden of proving its case
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court first addressed the conflicting evidentiary standards
between Nevada law and ICWA. Second, the Court analyzed the State law claims. Finally, the
Court addressed ICWA and the EIF exception.
Conflicting Evidentiary Standards
Nevada and ICWA have conflicting evidentiary standards for cases involving the
termination of parental rights. While Nevada has a "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard
for parental termination cases 2 ICWA requires the petitioner to prove its case "beyond a
reasonable doubt." 3
The Court held that Nevada’s "clear and convincing evidence" standard applies to state
law findings and the ICWA "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard applies to federal law
findings. The Court reasoned that ICWA sets forth "minimum Federal standards" 4 for the
removal of Native American children from their families only as it relates to ICWA-related
findings, not a uniform standard that applies to all findings. The Court also cited to a statute
which expressly states that ICWA's standards yield to other state or federal law if the law
"provides a higher standard of protection to rights of the parents[,]" than ICWA. 5 The Court
noted that nearly every state court that has interpreted the issue of conflicting standards came to
the same conclusion.
State Law Claims: Clear and Convincing Standard
Under Nevada law, "a petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
termination is in the child's best interest" and that parental fault exists.6 The Court found that
terminating parental rights was in N.J.'s best interest and that parental fault existed.
To decide what is in the child's best interest, a court looks to the child's continuing need
for "proper, physical, mental and emotional growth and development." 7 Also, it is presumed that
terminating parental rights in the child's best interest if the child has been in foster care for 14 of
any 20 consecutive months. 8 Applying the facts of the case, the Court held that the presumption
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applied and Dawn had the burden to overcome the presumption. 9 The Court held Dawn did not
overcome the burden because she failed to maintain sobriety and failed to bond with N.J.
When a child has been placed in foster care and the ultimate goal of the termination of
parental rights is to have the child's foster family adopt her, a court must look at "the extent the
[child's] familial identity is with that family[,]" 10 "[t]he length of time the child has lived in a
stable. . . foster home[,]" 11 and "[t] the permanence as a family unit of the foster family." 12 The
Court held that there was substantial evidence that N.J. was fully integrated into her foster
family. N.J. had been placed with the foster family since leaving the hospital following her birth.
Expert witnesses testified that N.J. was very well bonded with the foster family and removal
from the foster family would be traumatic.
Dawn also argued that there was not substantial evidence of parental fault. The district
court found parental fault on grounds of neglect, unfitness, and token efforts. A child is
neglected when a parent "neglects or refuses to provide proper or necessary subsistence,
education, medical or. . . other care necessary for [the child's] health, morals, or well-being." 13
Courts shall consider excessive drug and alcohol use 14 and the inability of public agencies to
reunify the child with the parents 15 when determining neglect. Applying the facts of the case, the
Court held Dawn's drug use, her failure to regularly visit with N.J., her failure to end an abusive
domestic relationship, and her failure to provide financial assistance demonstrated neglect.
An unfit parent is "any parent of a child who, by reason of his fault or habit or conduct
toward the child or other persons, fails to provide the child with proper care, guidance and
support." 16 The Court upheld the district court's determination of unfitness due to Dawn's
continued drug use and her failure to provide for any of N.J.'s physical or mental well-being.
Although Dawn maintained sobriety for a few months, the Court held that it was insignificant as
she continued to test positive for methamphetamine.
Parental fault can be established when a parent engages in only in token efforts to (1) "
support or communicate with the child; (2) "prevent neglect of the child"; (3) "avoid being an
unfit parent; or (4) "eliminate the risk of serious physical, mental or emotional [harm] to the
child." 17 The Court upheld that Dawn had only engaged in token efforts because she only
sporadically visited N.J., did not provide financial assistance, did not end an abusive domestic
relationship, and failed to address her drug use.
ICWA: Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard
ICWA's higher evidentiary standards were established due to concerns of an "alarmingly
high percentage" of Native American children removed from their families and the failure of
state courts to recognize traditional Native American social standards. Before terminating the
parental rights of a Native American child there must be "[a] determination, supported by
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including the testimony of a qualified expert witness, that
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the continued custody by the parent or [Native American] custodian is likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child[,]" 18 in addition to other determinations. 19
The Court upheld the district court's determination that DCFS did not provide a tribal
20
expert who could testify that returning N.J. to either of her parents would be likely to result in
serious emotional or physical damage to N.J. Although a tribal expert and a clinical social
worker testified, neither could testify as to whether returning N.J. would likely result in serious
emotional or physical damage to N.J. Therefore, DCFS did not meet ICWA's higher evidentiary
standard.
EIF Doctrine Exception
The Existing Indian Family (EIF) doctrine precludes ICWA from applying to cases where
the court determines that there is no existing Native American family, meaning the child is not,
and never was, part of a Native American family or tribe. 21 The Court held the EIF doctrine
should be used on a case-by-case basis to avoid results that are counter to ICWA's goal of
protecting the best interest of Native American children.
Here, the Court held the EIF doctrine was applied correctly because neither her father,
nor his tribe, were contesting the termination and the termination would not result in the breakup
of a Native American family. The Court also noted that the foster family had testified that they
were committed to educating N.J. about her Native American heritage.
Conclusion
When termination of parental cases implicates ICWA, a dual-standard burden of proof
should be used. Specifically, Nevada's "clear and convincing evidence" should be used for state
law findings and ICWA's "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard should be used for ICWA
findings. The application of Existing Indian Family Doctrine (EIF) may be appropriate when the
breakup of a Native American family is not at issue and neither the tribe nor the Native
American Parent is contesting the termination.
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